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We know much more today about the international sources of authoritarian rule than 
we did only a few years ago, but our knowledge remains limited. Recent research has 
demonstrated that external forces can promote and strengthen authoritarianism in 
ways that are similar to the international influences on democratization.1 One of the 
key subjects of this scholarship concerns the role of ‘autocracy promotion’, and 
numerous authors have engaged in systematic analysis of the role that external actors 
can play in promoting authoritarianism abroad.2 A wide array of countries, including 
Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, have been identified as 
crucial sponsors of authoritarian rulers in countries such as Bahrain, Syria and 
Zimbabwe. As a result of these patterns of international support and influence, the 
idea of autocracy promotion has gained considerable academic currency.3  
However, I argue that recent research on the topic of autocracy promotion is 
seriously flawed. Treatments of the concept have suffered from a number of critical 
problems that severely limit its analytical utility. While the literature on autocracy 
promotion has identified some clear patterns of external support for autocratic 
incumbents, it has so far failed to demonstrate that these efforts can best be 
understood as a unified, coherent set of foreign policies that constitute intentional 
efforts to promote a particular regime type abroad. Efforts to define the concept have 
been beset by ambiguity and conceptual stretching, and few scholars offer a clear 
definition that delimits precisely what counts, and does not count, as autocracy 
promotion. Where scholars have sought to identify and classify cases of autocracy 
promotion, they have tended to define the concept loosely and apply it broadly.  
In the discussion that follows, I both identify a number of key flaws in the existing 
treatments of autocracy promotion and offer a more clearly delineated definition. A 
number of scholars have already questioned how helpful the idea of autocracy 
promotion is when examining the international influences on authoritarian regimes.4 I 
build on these insights and identify the principal sources of problematic research in 
this area. The confusion and ambiguity surrounding autocracy promotion clusters 
around four key issues related to the type of activity under examination, namely the 
role of agency, intentions, motivations and effects. By addressing each issue in turn, I 
both highlight the deficiencies of existing treatments of the concept and identify a 
roadmap to establishing some conceptual clarity on the topic. I advance a ‘strict’ 
definition of autocracy promotion that requires a clear intent on the part of an external 
actor to bolster autocracy as a form of political regime, as well as an underlying 
motivation that rests in significant part on an ideological commitment to autocracy 
itself. Actions that fall short of these criteria, such as policies designed to promote 
objectives unrelated to regime type, or motivated purely for self-interested objectives, 
should not be treated as instances of autocracy promotion. Even if they have the effect 
of bolstering autocracy, they should be analysed using separate conceptual categories. 
This article presents a new typology of international influences on authoritarian rule 
that places autocracy promotion within the wider context of the external dimensions 
of authoritarian rule, and highlights a range of alternative concepts that more clearly 
capture the dynamics at work.   
The strict definition of autocracy promotion advanced here raises challenges of 
measurement and operationalisation, although I argue that these are not 
insurmountable. The recent historical record suggests that there is in fact little 
evidence of ideologically-driven autocracy promotion since the end of Cold War. To 
see clear efforts at autocracy promotion in practice, we must look to those historical 
instances where international powers actively sought to promote authoritarian models 
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abroad, such as the promotion of fascist and communist regimes during the interwar 
and early Cold War years. Consequently, the international influences on authoritarian 
politics in the post-Cold War period are best understood and analysed using a 
different set of concepts, which are further outlined below.   
The article proceeds in three main sections. The first section reviews and critiques 
the existing literature on autocracy promotion, identifying examples of the conceptual 
ambiguity that mars much of the scholarship on this topic. The second section sets out 
four considerations that should be addressed when seeking to conceptualise autocracy 
promotion, and which facilitate clear and precise concept formation. This discussion 
lays the foundation for establishing the ‘strict’ definition of autocracy promotion I 
advance here. The third section places discussions of autocracy promotion within the 
wider context of the international forces that can shape and bolster authoritarian rule, 
and presents a typology of international influences the builds on the conceptual 
distinctions developed in the previous section.  
 
 
The Conceptual Ambiguity of Autocracy Promotion  
Recent research on the international politics of authoritarian rule has greatly enhanced 
our understanding of the range and diversity of factors that enable autocratic elites to 
consolidate their rule and remain in power. Scholars have demonstrated the 
importance of cross-border learning and diffusion,5 the role of fluctuations in the 
international economy, 6  and patterns of international aid. 7  Research on the 
‘authoritarian resurgence’ has emphasised the role of external non-democratic 
sponsors such as Russia and China,8 while others have pointed to the autocracy-
supporting policies of major democracies, especially the US.9  
However, this broader research agenda is in the early stages of development, and 
further work is needed before the international dimensions of authoritarianism are 
understood as clearly as the international dimensions of democracy. One particular 
problem is that there has been limited progress in mapping the range of international 
influences on authoritarianism in conceptually precise ways.10 One of the clearest 
examples of this problem is the use of the idea of autocracy promotion, which has 
become a key focus of scholarly attention in recent years.11 Not all authors who 
examine the role that external actors can play in supporting authoritarianism at the 
domestic level use the language of autocracy promotion,12 but those who do have 
tended to use this concept in problematic ways. Few offer a clear definition that 
would help delimit precisely what counts, and does not count, as autocracy 
promotion, and several key contributions offer conceptualisations that are so loose 
that the utility of the concept begins to wash away. This is a particular problem 
because the term ‘autocracy promotion’ carries strong connotations given its 
similarity to the well-established idea of ‘democracy promotion’. Although there is 
not single agreed definition of democracy promotion (nor a single view of how it 
should be pursued), there is wide consensus that it entails policies designed, as 
Carothers articulates, ‘to foster and advance democratization’. 13  and its use 
immediately suggests a set of activities that mirrors those of the international 
community’s democracy promoters. This, however, creates misleading expectations 
that the reality of contemporary politics does not meet. 14  While many states do 
actively support autocratic incumbents, there is little evidence that they seek to 
promote autocracy in the way that many international actors seek to promote 
democracy. Combined with the lack of conceptual clarity that characterises much of 
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the research on this topic, the result is a conceptual innovation that ultimately has 
limited analytical utility.   
Peter Burnell was an early contributor to the literature on autocracy promotion, and 
helped focus attention on this form of activity. 15  However, Burnell defines the 
concept so widely that it appears to encompass multiple distinct forms of international 
influence that do not all include active regime promotion. Burnell offers both an 
inclusive and exclusive definition of autocracy promotion. The former is defined as 
‘all the international forces that move [a] political regime away from democracy and 
towards semi or fully authoritarian rule’, a definition so broad that it appears to 
encompass any form of international influence. The latter, exclusive, definition is 
focused on the agency and intentions of actors, and includes a number of external 
policies and influences: direct efforts to export autocracy, direct efforts to influence 
domestic politics in ways that unintentionally produce movement toward 
authoritarianism, and the process of authoritarian diffusion. While each of these are 
important international dynamics that may reinforce authoritarian rule, only the first 
(autocracy export) truly relates to a conscious effort by international actors to promote 
a particular form of regime type abroad. The other elements of Burnell’s exclusive 
definition of autocracy promotion are quite distinct from the promotion of a 
particular type of regime. As a result, the concept blurs the lines between distinct 
forms of external influence and makes it difficult to identify what does and does not 
count as autocracy promotion.  
Other research on the concept shares similar conceptual ambiguity. Vanderhill’s 
recent work on the international promotion of authoritarianism offers a systematic 
effort to generate theory about the effects of international sponsorship of authoritarian 
elites, with important empirical findings. Vanderhill defines the promotion of 
authoritarianism as behavior in which an external actor ‘is actively supporting illiberal 
elites, groups, or regimes through direct assistance’ (p.9). Yet, it is not entirely clear if 
external support for illiberal elites is tantamount to the promotion of authoritarianism, 
which refers to regime type rather than individual elites. Indeed, the author comments 
of external actors that ‘the primary goal of their support may not be to develop 
authoritarian regimes, but the outcome of their support is an increase in 
authoritarianism in the recipient country’ (p.8). However, this suggests that the 
process under investigation may not be the promotion of authoritarianism but rather 
the enabling of authoritarianism as a by-product of the promotion of some other goal. 
Many of Vanderhill’s examples, such as Russia’s energy deals with Belarus, 
Venezuelan economic aid to Nicaragua, and Iran’s influence on Hezbollah’s military 
strategy towards Israel, seem to constitute strategically-driven support for valuable 
allies abroad, rather than instances of a common policy to promote authoritarianism as 
a form of rule.  
Melnykovska et al. also describe autocracy promotion as a number of external 
influences that appear to be driven by motives other than support for a particular 
regime type. 16  They show, for example, that Chinese and Russian economic 
engagement in Central Asia has had the effect of reinforcing the status quo within the 
region’s authoritarian regimes, but it does not follow that it is appropriate to 
conceptualise this type of external influence as a form of regime promotion. The 
authors seek to ‘look at effects rather than intentions’ (p.77), but in framing their 
enquiry as one that concerns autocracy promotion, they make intentions inseparable 
from the study. This becomes problematic when the authors refer to Russian 
intentions that appear unrelated to the promotion of authoritarianism as a regime type, 
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including securing a monopoly over energy supplies in the region, and keeping 
Central Asian states economically dependent.17  
Yakouchyk has recently sought to offer a clear set of definitions regarding the 
distinction between democracy promotion and two different types of autocracy 
promotion. Yet despite offering some of the clearest definitions of diverse types of 
external regime promotion, Yakouchyk’s approach also suffers from conceptual 
problems. Yakouchyk offers definitions of both active and passive autocracy 
promotion, with the former being ‘characterized by intentionality’. Direct autocracy 
promotion constitutes deliberate actions to strengthen autocracy (or weaken 
democracy) while indirect autocracy promotion takes place ‘when deliberate actions 
aimed to strengthen the authoritarian regime are not evident’ but other, self-interested 
policies (such as commercial investments) have the side-effect of promoting 
autocracy. Yet promotion without intentionality appears to be a contradiction in 
terms, and the idea of ‘passive autocracy promotion’ seems to lack conceptual 
coherence. If something is being promoted, there is an intention to encourage its 
adoption or advancement. If there is no intention, there is no promotion.  
Overall, therefore, while this work on autocracy promotion has provided key 
insights into the activities of international actors who engage with authoritarian 
regimes, the effort to conceptualise such dynamics in similar terms to democracy 
promotion risks mislabelling a diverse set of foreign initiatives and influences. In 
order to properly categorise a distinct form of autocracy promotion, the concept itself 
would need clear boundaries that relate to the role of actors and their intentions and 
motivations. In the following section, I set out a series of considerations that allow for 
the development of more precise conceptual categories, and that identify the scope 




Clarifying the Concept: Towards a ‘Strict’ Definition of Autocracy Promotion  
At the heart of the problem with the literature on autocracy promotion is a problem 
with the challenging task of concept formation. The literature on concept formation 
offers many recommendations for the development of clear and precise concepts that 
facilitate the goals of classification and theory building, both of which are central to 
social science research. Gerring, for example, offers a set of criteria for determining 
the quality of a concept, and the idea of autocracy promotion appears to have many of 
the features of a good concept.18 Notably, the concept meets the criteria of familiarity 
and resonance.19 The words themselves are both well-known and familiar, and the 
terminology has the kind of ‘cognitive click’ that Gerring identifies as a key feature of 
resonance, not least because it suggests a form of activity that is similar to, but 
distinct from, the well-known concept of democracy promotion. Yet, I suggest it is 
precisely this quality of the concept, its resonance, that has led to some of the 
problems in its use and application. That the term immediately suggests a set of 
activities that is the mirror image of democracy promotion leads to expectations about 
the activities of autocracy promotion that cannot easily be met. By considering other 
aspects of the concept, it becomes clear that current treatments fall short on some 
other important criteria.  
First, it is a concept that often lacks internal coherence, meaning that its defining 
attributes do not necessarily fit well together. Second, it is a concept that, as currently 
defined, fails to aid the tasks of differentiation.20 The idea of autocracy promotion is 
only helpful if it helps us differentiate exactly what counts as autocracy promotion, 
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and what does not. Yet current treatments of the concept make it difficult to establish 
the boundaries between autocracy promotion and other foreign policies that affect 
autocratic states, or indeed any form of international influence that bolsters 
authoritarian regimes. Giovanni Sartori’s classic contribution on this topic warned of 
the dangers of conceptual stretching, that is, the risk that a concept would be applied 
to cases that fall outside the limits of the concept’s core definition.21 The treatments of 
autocracy promotion discussed above suffer from this problem, and appear to 
smuggle multiple forms of external influence under a single banner, over-burdening 
the concept and reducing its utility for differentiating distinct international activities 
and influences. 
In order to tease out the limitations of the concept, and the problems with recent 
efforts to apply it to contemporary politics, I make a distinction between four different 
considerations that can help disentangle the elements that should, and should not, be 
considered as defining features of autocracy promotion.22 These four considerations 
relate to:  
1) the presence or absence of agency 
2) the intended target of the policy in question 
3) the underlying motives behind the policy 
4) the effects of the policy.  
By working through each consideration in turn, I highlight the flaws of existing 
approaches and provide a roadmap to a more precise, albeit it more limited and 
narrower, concept of autocracy promotion. I argue that efforts to classify instances of 
autocracy promotion should rest on consideration of the first three key criteria only 
(relating to agency, intentions and motivations) but should eschew any consideration 
of the fourth (relating to effects). Operationalizing any definition of autocracy 
promotion will be difficult, not least because the contemporary international climate 
provides state leaders with incentives to conceal intentional efforts to support or 
promote autocracy as a form of rule.23 In this paper I strive first and foremost to make 
a conceptual rather than an empirical contribution, but in the sections that follow I 
provide illustrative examples to highlight the different forms of activity that fall 
within the different categories of international behaviour I identify. I discuss the 
challenges of operationalisation further in the conclusion.  
 
The Presence of Agency 
The first criterion to consider when conceptualising and classifying autocracy 
promotion concerns the role of agency. Regime promotion, of either the democratic or 
autocratic variety, requires agency. The presence of some form of intentional policy is 
built into the terminology of the concept itself: the word ‘promotion’ denotes an act of 
encouragement or support, a conscious campaign of work towards a particular goal. If 
promotion is taking place, there must be a promoter acting with intent. Yet some of 
the recent discussions of the concept have seemed to apply it to international forces 
that do not include a significant, or any, role of international agency. Burnell’s 
‘inclusive’ definition of autocracy promotion includes ‘all the international forces that 
move [a] political regime away from democracy and towards semi or fully 
authoritarian rule. The deliberate actions of external actors to export democracy might 
be but a small part’.24  Yet any international forces that do not involve the deliberate 
actions of external actors should not be considered a form of promotion, which by its 
very definition requires such deliberate action. Burnell also suggests that ‘any 
understanding of autocracy promotion’ could include forms of diffusion of 
authoritarian values across borders ‘with or without the active encouragement of the 
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authoritarian source’, which Burnell views as ‘probably the most intriguing of all 
dimensions of autocracy promotion’.25 Yet while some forms of diffusion can indeed 
include a role for intentional regime promotion,26 any form of diffusion that operates 
‘without the active encouragement of the authoritarian source’ simply cannot be 
viewed as a type of regime promotion. A similar problem can be seen in Yakouchyk’s 
effort to conceptualise ‘passive autocracy promotion’, defined in part in terms of the 
absence of deliberate actions aimed at strengthen autocracy. 27  
In sum, active and intentional agency must be central to any concept of autocracy 
promotion, and passive or structural influences on authoritarian regimes should not be 
viewed as instances of the concept. Autocracy promotion is a foreign policy, pursued 
by external actors (usually state actors) acting with intent. Yet, even if we can agree 
on the role of agency and intent, we encounter the challenge of specifying which 
types of foreign policy count as forms of autocracy promotion. This challenge can be 




The Role of Intentions 
Not all policies that are designed to affect the internal politics of autocratic regimes 
can be counted as policies of autocracy promotion. The next question to address, 
therefore, concerns the issue of how to determine which policies might reasonably be 
classified as acts of autocracy promotion. This issue appears straightforward: to count 
as autocratic promotion, external policies should be driven by the intention to promote 
transition to or consolidation of an autocratic regime, just as democracy promotion 
activities should be those that are intended to promote transitions to or consolidation 
of democratic regimes.  
Intentions are thus central to any understanding of regime promotion. In earlier 
writings, Burnell advanced a definition of democracy assistance that included a key 
stipulation about intentions: ‘democratic advance must be the primary objective 
although not necessarily the only objective.’ 28 Yet current accounts of autocracy 
promotion, including Burnell’s recent work, have not followed this stipulation. The 
idea of autocracy promotion has been attached to a wide variety of policies that 
appear to be driven by a wide variety of intentions, not all of which are concerned 
with the advance of any particular type of regime. While studies of autocracy 
promotion have identified some external efforts to promote activities that might be 
viewed as constituent elements of authoritarianism (e.g. election fraud, repression) 
they have also pointed to a range of other generally supportive policies such as trade, 
development assistance, energy subsidies and military support that appear unrelated to 
the promotion of any particular type of system of government.  
Vanderhill’s analysis of Russian support for electoral misconduct in Ukraine, for 
example, appears consistent with the idea that Russia is seeking to promote autocratic 
forms of rule. 29  By contrast, Vanderhill’s discussion of Iranian support for 
Hezbollah’s military strategies does not convincingly demonstrate that the intended 
aim of these policies is the advancement of autocratic rule, rather than some other 
goal such as the promotion of a Shiite regional revolution.30 Similarly, Melnykovska 
et al frame Russian economic policies in Central Asia as instances of autocracy 
promotion, even as they explicitly state that ‘Russia’s focus is mostly directed at 
maintaining its monopoly over Central Asian energy resources’ and Russia’s ‘central 
goal’ is ‘keeping the Central Asian states economically dependent’.31  
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I argue that these are instances of misclassification, and that external policies that 
are designed and intended to achieve objectives unrelated to regime type should not 
be considered as instances of regime promotion. Any definition of autocracy 
promotion must take intentions seriously, and must include a stipulation that the 
policies have the principal purpose of promoting autocracy abroad. This in turn must 
lead to rigorous and strict classification, so that only those policies that include such 
intentions are included in discussions of autocracy promotion.  
Establishing actor intentions empirically is not always easy, especially in settings 
where those seeking to assist autocratic actors abroad may have an incentive to 
conceal their aims. Yet there are a number of indicators that can be used to identify 
actor intentions.32 First, scholars can look at the statements of those international 
actors who are seeking to shape the domestic politics of countries abroad. While 
actors may sometimes wish to conceal their objectives, at times intervening countries 
can offer clear indications of their intentions to support and prop autocratic regimes 
abroad. For example, Saudi Arabia voiced robust support for President Mubarak in 
Egypt as his regime became threatened by public uprisings in 2011.33 Second, it is 
sometimes possible to infer intentions from the behaviour of external actors, and in 
particular the type of policies they pursue at the domestic level. Domestic actors often 
gain and maintain power by pursuing authoritarian practices such as coups, election 
fraud and violent repression. When external actors assist domestic actors in the 
pursuit of these activities, such behaviour can clearly indicate a desire to bolster or 
protect autocratic actors abroad. By contrast, more general policies of economic aid or 
the provision of energy subsidies are less obviously indicators of an intentional policy 
to support autocratic actors, as they may serve to achieve other goals (such as the 
promotion of economic development or as leverage to extract policy concessions). 
For example, Russia’s support for election fraud in Ukraine in 2004 is a clearer 
indicator of an intention to bolster autocracy than Russian energy subsidies to the 
country. Third, scholars can also look at the timing of external support. If there are 
surges of supportive policies (for example, spikes in economic aid, or in diplomatic 
support) that coincide with challenges to autocratic rule at the domestic level, such 
intensification of support can indicate an intention to protect the regime itself. For 
example, after General Sisi initiated a coup against President Morsi in Egypt in 2013, 
Saudi Arabia offered a massive aid package to Cairo.34 Such a spike in economic aid 




The Underlying Motives 
A third consideration concerns the underlying motivation or strategy that is served by 
promoting autocracy abroad. Intentions and motives are related, but not the same. 
Intentions concern the purpose of the policy – what is it intended to achieve. 
Autocracy promotion is by definition intended to promote autocratic rule as a form of 
government. The underlying motives behind such an intention, however, may be 
diverse, and the goal of sponsoring autocratic regimes may be pursued for a variety of 
reasons: ideological or strategic, altruistic or self-interested. 35  I argue that any 
treatment of autocracy promotion must engage with this issue of motivations, yet 
many recent studies treat external motives in only a cursory fashion.36 In particular, I 
argue that only policies that are driven by certain types of motivation should count as 
instances of autocracy promotion. This is because many of the forms of behaviour 
that have been identified as autocracy promotion do not reflect a proactive motivation 
 9 
to promote a form of regime abroad, but rather reflect a reactive desire to prevent the 
spread of democracy. To tease out the importance of this distinction, I identify three 
principal motivations that might drive policies intended to bolster or support 
autocratic regimes, two of which rest on instrumental self-interest and one of which 
rests on ideological commitment. Only the latter motivation characterises genuine 
cases of autocracy promotion.  
The first motive concerns those instances where transitions to democracy in one 
setting are viewed as a threat to political authority in another. Outside actors often 
fear that the collapse of authoritarianism abroad will have a contagion effect, and 
unleash democratic forces at home.37 As a result, states will have an interest in 
seeking to protect autocratic incumbents abroad for domestic interests, primarily in 
order to preserve political power.38 A second motivation that drives support for 
autocratic regimes concerns instrumental considerations about policy alignment. 
Powerful states often wish to maintain and protect authoritarian regimes abroad in 
order to ensure that supportive and compliant allies remain in power. Such support for 
autocratic regimes, as opposed to just authoritarian incumbents, becomes paramount 
when there is disjuncture between government policy and popular opinion, raising 
concerns that free and fair elections would give rise to a new government that would 
abandon pre-existing alliances and commitments. The support for autocracy in such 
cases arises not out of a fear that democratisation might lead to instability or loss of 
authority at home, but rather out of strategic concerns in terms of national security 
and economic interests. Consequently, both democracies and autocracies are likely to 
share these concerns when their interests are at stake, whereas only autocratic regimes 
are likely to support autocracies abroad due to a fear of contagion. Brownlee has 
shown, for example, how US support for Egypt is rooted in the alignment of domestic 
and foreign policies in Cairo with those of the US.39 
These two sets of motivations lead to policies that are best described as democracy 
prevention or resistance, rather than autocracy promotion. Several scholars have 
already sought to identify democracy resistance as a distinct form of foreign policy.40 
Yet to date the defining features of this policy have remained somewhat unclear, 
especially in relation to the boundaries between democracy resistance and autocracy 
promotion. I argue that the two sets of policies are related, but distinct. They are 
related in that they both rest on intentional efforts to bolster autocratic regimes 
abroad. They are distinct in that they are both driven by different underlying 
motivations. I define democracy resistance as policies designed to support autocratic 
regimes abroad as a means to avoid the negative externalities that come with 
transitions to democracy. By contrast, autocracy promotion is defined in terms of the 
third motivation that can drive external actors to shore up and support autocratic elites 
abroad, namely an ideological commitment to authoritarianism as a form of regime 
type.  
This definition of autocracy promotion is strict, in that efforts to protect autocratic 
elites and regimes abroad are only considered cases of autocracy promotion if they are 
driven in significant part by ideological motivations related to regime type. I do not 
argue that ideological concerns must be the only motivations – most foreign policies 
are characterised by some mix of motivations. Rather, I argue that ideological 
motivations must be a major driver of the policy in question, and that there must be a 
clear ideological commitment to promote a particular, non-democratic regime type. It 
is also not sufficient for the foreign policy in question to have any ideological goals. 
Rather, the ideological commitment must relate to autocracy as a form of regime. For 
example, the foreign policies of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez were closely linked to 
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ideological preferences for populist, left-leaning and anti-Western regimes within 
Latin America,41 but these preferences primarily related to public policies rather than 
any over-arching regime type.42 Similarly, while Saudi Arabian foreign policies have 
included ideological elements, including a desire to promote Islam abroad, this falls 
short of systematic promotion of authoritarianism as a form of regime.43 As Gause has 
observed in relation to Saudi’s intervention in Bahrain in 2011, for example, Saudi 
Arabia’s actions should not be viewed as a form of regional autocracy promotion. 
Riyadh’s focus was ‘on checking and rolling back Iranian influence in the Arab 
world. That is what drives their policy, not some imagined notion of anti-
revolutionary dictatorial solidarity.”44  
 
The Effects  
Finally, I briefly address (and reject) a fourth possible criterion for classifying cases 
of autocracy promotion, regarding the effects of such activities on the target state. A 
number of treatments of autocracy promotion have sought to define such activities 
with reference, at least in part, to the supportive or bolstering effects they have on 
autocratic regimes. Yakouchyk’s definition of passive autocracy promotion 
essentially defines such activities based not of their intention or target, but on their 
effects. They are external policies that support authoritarian regimes as a side-effect 
of policies that are designed for other purposes – it is the unintentional effects on 
autocracy that appear to qualify them as instances of passive autocracy promotion.45 
Similarly, Burnell’s inclusive definition of autocracy promotion – ‘all the 
international forces that move [a] political regime away from democracy and towards 
semi or fully authoritarian rule’ - is explicitly based on the effects of international 
forces, rather than on actions, intentions or motives. Finally, Melnykovska et al are 
explicit on this issue, stating that ‘we look at effects rather than intentions’.46  
In each of these examples, the presence of autocracy promotion is inferred from 
the strengthening of the autocratic regime rather than the goals or actions of external 
actors. However, such reasoning is problematic for two reasons. First, defining and 
classifying autocracy promotion according to its effects allows for scholars to identify 
cases of autocracy promotion that lack some of the key identifying features discussed 
above, including actor intention. Even if international forces have the effect of 
bolstering authoritarian rule, they should not be considered instances of autocracy 
promotion if they do not entail intentional efforts to support autocracy itself. Second, 
this kind of reasoning conflates the activity under investigation with its possible 
outcomes. If autocracy promotion is to be a useful concept, part of that utility will 
derive from its role in theory building. For example, if we wish to establish if 
autocracy promotion efforts actually work,47 it is imperative to keep the effects of the 
activities distinct from the definition of the activity itself. To smuggle consideration 
of the effects into the definition of the policy itself will give rise to tautological 
reasoning, and will undermine efforts at theory building. The democracy promotion 
literature is replete with efforts to assess the impact and effectiveness of democracy 
promotion activities, with often mixed findings regarding their success. 48  Such 
findings can only be achieved if the activity is defined in a way that leaves open the 
effects of the policy on the target of interest. In sum, defining autocracy promotion 
according to its effects in bolstering autocracy risks including cases that do not 
involve intentional regime promotion, and excluding cases of genuine regime 




A TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES 
Autocracy promotion thus constitutes one narrow form of international influence that 
can reinforce authoritarian rule, yet it has gained a disproportionate amount of 
attention within the recent literature on the international dimensions of 
authoritarianism. In order to illustrate some of the key distinctions made above, and to 
put autocracy promotion within the wider context of the international politics of 
autocratic rule, in this section I present a typology of international dimensions of 
autocratic endurance and survival (see Figure 1). The typology is derived from asking 
four questions about the source and nature of the international influence that are 
related to the discussions above about intentions and motivations. By creating a set of 
distinct categories based on clear points of contrast, the typology facilitates more fine-
grained classifications and overcomes some of the conceptual confusion in the 
existing literature.49 The categories outlined in the typology are ideal types, and in 
practice autocratic incumbents may be subject to the interaction of several external 
influences. They nonetheless provide a useful set of concepts with which to make 
sense of diverse influences that have often been conflated and over-aggregated.  
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 The first distinction in the typology addresses the question of whether the 
influence is a passive or an active one. Active influences are defined by the 
involvement of intentional policies of external actors. Passive influences, on the other 
hand, include external forces that reinforce authoritarian rule without the participation 
of any actor intention. The literature has identified several types of passive influence 
on authoritarianism, which I group into four distinct clusters:  
- diffusion and learning processes tied to distant events50  
- the influence of the international system of sovereign state51  
- the shifting nature of the international economy52  
- the role of international linkages.53  
As discussed above, some of these have been included in discussions of external 
autocracy promotion, but should be treated as distinct influences that are characterised 
by the lack of intentional foreign policies to shape domestic politics. Many diffusion 
processes, for example, should not be conflated with autocracy promotion in the 
absence of intentional promotion. China’s ability to learn from distant events in 
Eastern Europe in 1989,54 and similar learning processes during the Arab Spring that 
contributed to the strengthening of autocratic regimes,55 clearly entailed important 
international dynamics, but do not meet the criteria of intentional regime promotion. 
Active forces represent fundamentally distinct types of influences by virtue of the 
role of actor intention. However, as the specific intention of external actors can vary 
greatly, it is necessary to distinguish those external actions that are intended to 
support the position of incumbent autocratic elite actors, and those that are pursued 
for some other objective. The second distinction thus separates efforts at autocratic 
sponsorship from the role of unintended consequences. The latter category entails a 
broad range of possible policies that can reinforce the position of authoritarian elites 
despite the intentions of the intervening party. For example, democracy promotion has 
been shown to be counter-productive in certain settings.56 Development aid has been 
associated with greater authoritarian stability due to the ‘aid curse’, which can 
facilitate the politics of patronage that is often central to autocratic rule.57 Similarly, 
international sanctions that are designed to punish authoritarian leaders have 
sometimes had the unintended effect of bolstering their position.58  
By contrast, autocratic sponsorship entails intentional international assistance to 
elite incumbents to help them to assume or retain their positions in power.59 Yet, the 
types of policy that involve external sponsorship of autocratic incumbents are diverse 
and further disaggregation is needed. The third question thus teases out the important 
differences between democratic resistance and autocracy promotion discussed above.  
Much of the activity that has been identified in the literature as autocracy promotion 
would be better understood as efforts at democracy resistance. For example, several 
authors have framed Russian support for autocratic practices in the post-Soviet sphere 
as autocracy promotion, especially with regard to policies in Ukraine and Belarus.60  
However, Russia’s relations with its autocratic neighbours have rested in large part on 
a desire to further Moscow’s geopolitical interests by protecting and promoting 
compliant allies and limiting the chances that genuine democracy might bring to 
power pro-Western elites who would sever close ties to Moscow.61 As Way has 
observed, Russia ‘has been less interested in promoting authoritarianism as such. 
Russian leaders have instead focused on countering US influence and promoting 
Russia’s more narrow economic and geopolitical interests.’62 Much of Russia’s 
foreign policy towards its autocratic neighbours, therefore, can be understood as 
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efforts to prevent the negative externalities that would come with democratization in 
the region, rather than efforts to spread a Russian model of autocracy.  
I argue in fact that there is little evidence that autocracy promotion as I define it 
here has been a significant feature of the post-Cold War world. Ideologically-driven 
regime promotion of this kind can be most clearly seen in earlier periods of history. 
Owen identifies several periods of international history when such ideological clashes 
led to waves of forceful regime promotion, often including the intentional promotion 
of autocratic forms of rule, such as absolutist monarchy, fascism and communism. 63 
In the 19th century, republican and monarchical regimes sought to promote their own 
regime forms, with many monarchies promoting absolutist autocratic regimes abroad. 
During the 20th century, the struggle was between democracy, communism and 
fascism, and many of the clearest examples of ideologically-driven regime promotion 
can be seen in the projects of fascist and communist internationalism of the interwar 
and early post-war periods in Europe.64  In the wake of the Second World War, 
Stalin’s Soviet Union forcefully imposed political regimes in Central and Eastern 
Europe. This was partly driven by strategic concerns – Stalin wished to control the 
territories in Eastern Europe to minimise any further threat from Germany and to gain 
the spoils of economic exploitation.65 But the imperial intent was also ideological in 
nature, and Stalin sought to create communist regimes rather than simply compliant 
governments. As a leading scholar of the period has observed, the Soviet take-over 
proceeded ‘along the lines of a presupposed set of ideological premises’, involving 
‘institutional and ideological transfer based on the premise of radical transformation 
and of cultural revolution’.66 Stalin aimed to impose new political and social orders 
modelled on the Soviet regime, with ideological intent.67  By contrast, the recent 
policies that have been identified as cases of autocracy promotion appear to lack this 




I have sought to demonstrate that current treatments of autocracy promotion suffer 
from a number of serious conceptual flaws. Scholars have grouped together diverse 
forms of international influence that include both intentional and unintentional effects, 
as well as multiple instances of external support that are driven by purely instrumental 
and strategic motivations rather than any ideological commitment to authoritarianism. 
By contrast, I have argued that in order for the idea of autocracy promotion to be 
useful, it must apply only to those cases where there is a clear intention to promote 
autocracy as a regime type, based in significant part on an ideological commitment to 
authoritarianism itself. Doing so enables a clearer conceptual distinction between 
diverse forms of international influence, and facilitates more fine-grained analysis of 
contemporary cross-border policies.  
Yet advancing this strict definition of autocracy promotion is not free from 
challenging implications, two of which I address here. The first concerns 
operationalisation, and relates to the difficulty of identifying the true intentions and 
motivations of international actors. As Gerring has observed, a concept that facilitates 
differentiation must also be one that enables operationalisation.69 Yet finding reliable 
and observable indicators for actor intentions and motivations is fraught with 
difficulty, especially when the activities involved may be ones that the relevant actors 
will have incentives to conceal. The second implication of a strict definition is that the 
category may be so narrow as to be effectively analytically useless. If it applies only 
to a restricted set of cases that can only be found in the political history of the 
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previous century, it may not be worth including in contemporary typologies. When 
combined with the challenge of operationalisation, this raises the question of whether 
the concept should be abandoned altogether.  
I argue that the answer to this question depends in large part on the research 
question being pursued. If the researcher is broadly interested in the international 
forces that protect or bolster autocratic regimes, then it may not be so essential to 
tease out the differences between the different forms of autocratic sponsorship. It may 
be sufficient to talk in relatively broad terms about international allies and 
international sponsors that pursue policies that reinforce authoritarian rule, and the 
principal challenge will be to tease out the causal mechanisms that link international 
actions to domestic outcomes. Whether some of those effects are intended or 
unintended maybe be of secondary concern, if a concern at all.  
If, on the other hand, a key element of the research question concerns the nature of 
foreign policy, then these conceptual discussions remain critical. If we wish to 
understand why actors support political incumbents in autocratic regimes, and if we 
wish to theorise about the effects of different types of foreign policy, then we need to 
disaggregate our concepts with reference to intentions and motivations, and we need 
ultimately to tackle the thorny problem of operationalisation. This is not easy, but also 
not impossible. There are many concepts we use in the social sciences that are 
important, but difficult to observe and measure (e.g. culture, norms, sovereignty). 
Difficulties of measurement should not, however, preclude the development and use 
of such concepts, and there are strategies that can be used to mitigate some of the 
challenges that exist. Some recent research on the international sponsorship of 
authoritarian regimes has plausibly identified motivations based on consideration of 
rhetoric, behaviour and also the correlation of particular foreign policies with regime 
characteristics that allow for plausible inferences. Brownlee, for example, illustrates 
the security motivations behind US efforts at ‘democracy prevention’ in Egypt 
through a comparison of US policy in Tunisia, which contained fewer strategic 
interests for Washington and received less interference as a result.70 Similarly, Kuntz 
and Odinius evaluate a range of theories about Saudi Arabia’s regional post-Arab 
Spring policies, and draw inferences about Riyadh’s motivations by comparing 
policies across multiple cases and eliminating those that follow no pattern.71 Through 
careful selection of cases and evidence, scholars can infer the existence of actor 
intentions and motivations even in the absence of clear statements of intent. 
Operationalisation will always be a challenge with this topic, but not an 
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